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James MacPherson

Canadian Constitutional Law
and Madame Justice Bertha
Wilson - Patriot, Visionary
and Heretic*

Introduction

A couple of weeks ago the man who teaches a seminar in Soviet Law
at Osgoode Hall Law School - a learned emigrd from U.S.S.R. and a
good and popular teacher - bemoaned the fact that his seminar had
the lowest enrolment in the ten or so years he has taught it at Osgoode.
Citing the exceptional excitement and high profile of recent developments in the U.S.S.R. and suggesting that legal questions and implications were central to these developments, I expressed genuine amazement at this news. My colleague, however, said that he was not at all
surprised; holding up his course outline he said: "I am not sure that
one word in these materials is an accurate description of Soviet legal
institutions and law, especially constitutional law. I think that most
students are waiting until things settle down so that they can take the
seminar when there is some content".
My colleague's observation may say something interesting about
student course selection psychology. However, it also made me think
about the fragility of countries and their constitutions. The U.S.S.R.,
Yugoslavia, South Africa, all of Europe - the newspapers and television screens are filled with stories about profound and fundamental
change, including constitutional change.
In Canada we view the world scene and probably think that we are
not caught in this swift Fundy-like tide of change; that we are a firm
undertow of stability. In the constitutional arena, most of the most
important developments in recent years confirm this image of stability. Probably the most important constitutional development in the
1970s was the election in 1976 of the Parti Quebecois Government
which posed the threat, perhaps more seriously than any time in our
history, of the dissolution of the country. By 1980, after a relatively
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close referendum vote, this threat had receded (for a decade!). The
constitutional status quo was preserved. And the 1990s were marked,
again in the first year of a new decade, by the complete failure of both
the process and the contents of the Meech Lake constitutional negotiations. The constitutional status quo was again preserved, however
discredited it may be in the minds of Canadians in various parts of the
country.
It would be wrong, however, to think that the Canadian Constitution is immutable, that it is immune from the tides of constitutional
change that seem to wash against the shores of even the strongest of
nations like the U.S.S.R. The history of Canada has been marked by
regular and important constitutional change. The imagery of change
has not been as dramatic as the recent magazine cover picture of an
ordinary citizen standing on the face of the huge toppled statue of
Vladimir Lenin in Vilnius. Nevertheless, constitutional change in
Canada has been an important part of our history and it remains today
(probably unfortunately) the centrepiece of public discourse in the
country.
This point was illustrated historically in the early years of the
country by what happened to some of the themes that the Fathers of
Confederation, especially Sir John A. Macdonald, thought lay at the
heart of the Constitution Act, 1867. Three of the most important
themes were the dominance of the national government over the
provinces (Macdonald: "We have given the General Legislature all
the great subjects."'), the belief that there was no important conflict in
the distribution of powers between the national and provincial governments (Macdonald: "We have avoided all conflict of jurisdiction and
authority." 2), and the assumption that if the occasional disagreement
should arise, it could easily be resolved by invocation by the national
government of its trump card, the disallowance power (hence, no need
for courts to play a role in Canadian constitutional law). As every first
year constitutional law student and every Supreme Court of Canada
judge sitting here this afternoon know, none of these themes holds
today; indeed they did not even survive Sir John A.'s second administration.
The reality of regular constitutional change in Canada is also
illustrated by developments in recent years. In 1972 when Isat in this
classroom and took constitutional law from Professor (now Justice)
1. Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of Confederation, 3rd Session, 8th Parliament of
Canada (1865), at p.33.
2. Loc. cit.
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MacKay, the course was punctuated on a single occasion by Professor
MacKay coming to class and happily announcing that the Supreme
Court of Canada had handed down a decision in a constitutional case.
The themes of Canadian constitutional law at that time were: the
invisibility and lack of importance of constitutional law in political
and legal affairs, the central (almost exclusive) place of federalism as
the subject matter of constitutional law, and the absence of any meaningfil role for the Supreme Court of Canada as umpire of the federal
system because of the lingering dominance of the Pearsonian conception of negotiated, executive federalism. 3 In short, in 1972 constitutional law played only a marginal role in our national life, in the work
of the Supreme Court of Canada and in Canadian legal education.
If the pages of the calendar are turned forward a decade to 1982,
the year Bertha Wilson arrived at the Supreme Court, the picture has
changed substantially. In the political arena, constitutional matters
have been at the top of the national agenda for six years, since the
election of the Parti Quebecois Government in Quebec in 1976. Moreover, as the Trudeau years rolled on through the 1970s they were
marked by the almost complete dismemberment of Pearsonian federalism. The major federal-provincial disputes of the 1970s over language, communications, energy, offshore resources and many other
subjects were not resolved in political councils. The importance of
many of these issues to the provinces, the political strength and confidence of some of the Premiers (notably Blakeney, Lougheed and
Peckford) and, perhaps most important, the intellectual conception of
federalism and combativeness of Prime Minister Trudeau combined to
shift many major federal-provincial issues from the political councils
to the Supreme Court of Canada. All of these changes were complete
when Bertha Wilson joined the Court in 1982. One other constitutional change was almost complete at that time, although it had meant
nothing in real terms when Justice Wilson took her oath of office. I
refer, of course, to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
which came into force almost simultaneously with the arrival of
Justice Wilson in Ottawa. Although the Canadian Constitution had
always had some individual and group rights content (e.g. the preamble of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 as interpreted by a few judges and
sections 93 and 133 of the same Act dealing with denominational
school and language rights) it was intended and expected by the

3. The term 'executive federalism' was coined by Professor Donald Smiley in CanadaIn
Question (3rd ed. 1980), at p.9 4 .

220 The Dalhousie Law Journal

signatories to the ConstitutionAct, 1982 which contained the Charter
that this document would usher in a new era in Canadian constitutional history, one in which the relationship between all Canadian
governments and all Canadians would be as important and prominent
as the century-long attention to the relationship between the national
and provincial governments.
If one turns the pages of the calendar one last time, again about a
decade, to June 1991 when Justice Wilson retires, one sees clearly that
Canadian constitutional law has changed again. This time the changes
have been massive and transformative. First, many of the major
political issues of our times, national and provincial, have been
'constitutionalized'. They have not been, as some have contended,
removed from the political arena. Politicians and governments still
must address and try to resolve them. However, the issues no longer
stay or end in the political arena. They move from there to the courts,
especially the Supreme Court of Canada, because the Charter gives
people unhappy with a result in the political arena an opportunity to
challenge that result in the judicial arena. Thus, virtually all of the
important political issues of the 1980s - economic policy, labour
relations, national defence and security, Sunday closing, abortion,
mandatory retirement - have found their way to the Supreme Court
of Canada. Public policy issues have never in our history been so
firmly rooted in the legal context. And the Supreme Court of Canada
has never before played such a prominent and significant role in the
discussion and resolution of those issues. These conclusions are
supported in an overwhelming way by an examination of the Court's
workload during Justice Wilson's nine-year tenure. In 1982, her first
year, the Court heard four constitutional cases; in 1985, the first year
in which a normal stream of Charter cases came before the Court, the
number was twenty-five; in 1990, Justice Wilson's final full year, the
number is sixty-eight, including fifty-four Charter cases!
These statistics, coupled with the earlier list of subject matters that
have come to the Court under the umbrella of the Charter, make
obvious a point that practically all Canadians know, if only intuitively
namely, that the Charter has transformed, I believe irrevocably,
Canadian public affairs. It has also transformed forever Canadian
constitutional law and the institution of the Supreme Court of Canada.
I happen to believe that these Charter-induced transformations
have been, by and large, beneficial. I can state my personal conclusions about ten years of experience in what Professor Peter Russell
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calls Charter Land' in four propositions. First, the Charter has shifted
the focus of law-makers from excessive attention to questions of
jurisdiction (can we enact this law?) to beneficial attention to questions of merit (should we enact this law?). Second, if one believes that
a Constitution can perform an important educative function, that it
can, in the words of my old constitutional law professor, Archibald
Cox, "remind us of our better selves" 5 then the Charter-induced
attention, not only in the political and legal arenas but also in the
minds of ordinary Canadians, to questions of democratic rights, fundamental freedoms, legal rights, equality rights, and minority language rights, is a laudable educational development. Thirdly, the
actual results of Charter litigation have been, by and large, beneficial
for major, and often neglected, groups in Canadian society - for
example, refugees (Singh'), non-unionized workers (EdwardsBooks 7 )
and women (Morgentaler). Fourthly, the Supreme Court of Canada
has become a fine Canadian institution which plays well its role on the
constitutional stage.
In all of these constitutional developments - political, legal, judicial and educational - no one has played a larger or more important
role than Justice Bertha Wilson. She has been central and crucial to
both the process and results of Canadian constitutional law in the first
decade of the Charter era. Through her judgments, and to a lesser
extent through her speeches and articles, she has played the roles of
thinker, decision-maker and educator.
In the remainder of this paper I will consider Justice Wilson's
contribution to Canadian constitutional law. The paper has three
parts. Each has a different theme, although the themes overlap in
places. I have given these themes labels, each reflecting, I believe, a
significant feature of Justice Wilson's constitutional thinking and
writing. The labels are Justice Wilson as - Patriot, Visionary and
Heretic. In the next three parts of this paper I will deal with each of
these themes, with reference principally to her decisions in Charter
cases but also with occasional references to her decisions in other
categories of constitutional cases, her speeches and articles, and my
impressions of her when, for almost three years, I had the privilege of
watching her work on the second floor of the Supreme Court building.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Russell, The First Two Years in Charter Land (June, 1984).
Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (1976), at p.117.
ReSinghandMinisterofEmployment and Immigration(1985), 17 D.LR. (4th) 422 (S.C.C.).
Edwards Books and Art Ltd. et aL v. R. (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) I (S.C.C.).
Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. R. (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
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Before turning to these matters, however, I want to underline the
magnitude of Justice Wilson's role in Canadian constitutional law by
referring to a few statistics. During her nine years at the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Court heard 217 constitutional cases. Justice
Wilson participated in 188 or 85.7 per cent of these cases. Moreover,
she wrote judgments in 69 or 36.5 per cent of the cases in which she
participated. These participation and writing rates are even higher in
Charter cases. She participated in 89 per cent of the Court's Charter
cases and wrote judgments in 43.6 per cent of the cases in which she
participated (65:149). These statistics support what all of us know by
instinct - Justice Wilson had a deep interest in and commitment to
the development of the Charter in its formative years and, of equal
importance, she had the energy to follow through on her interest and
commitment by writing a very large number of constitutional judgments during her career.
I. The PatriotTheme
Although Justice Wilson was born in Scotland she is now formally a
Canadian citizen. She is, however, more than just a citizen. She is, in
a very real and visible sense, a Canadian patriot. She loves her
country and openly and zealously supports its authority and its interests. Her patriotism includes both her personal feelings about Canada
and her articulation of the strength and distinctiveness of Canadian
law and the Canadian legal system.
Justice Wilson gave voice to her personal feelings about Canada at
her sweating-in ceremony at the Supreme Court of Canada:
I am a Canadian by choice and by adoption -like so many who have
come from other places to make Canada their home. We cherish the
free and open society which has been built here with its rich mosaic of
creeds, cultures and customs and we are proud and grateful to have
been accepted into its fold. As part of that constituency I carry with me
to this new task a proper pride and deep affection for my adopted
country. 9
She enlarged upon this theme in the address she delivered in 1987
entitled "The Scottish Enlightenment: The Third Schumiatcher Lecture in 'Law as Literature.':

9. (1982), 16 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 172 at 179.
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I have never quite been able to understand the emotional springs that
give rise to the love and pride I hold for both the land of my birth and
the country of my adoption, how easy it has been for me to become a
Canadian and feel completely at home in both French and English
Canada."
On the jurisprudential side, Justice Wilson was clearly of the view
that the Constitution was imbued with Canadian history, values and
aspirations. It is true that the Constitution Act, 1867 enunciates a
collective desire that the new country have "a Constitution similar in
Principle to that of the United Kingdom"." It is also true that the
ConstitutionAct, 1982, especially the CharterofRights andFreedoms,
draws substantial inspiration from the United States Bill of Rights and
various international human rights instruments. To Justice Wilson
and indeed to the entire Court in the last decade, however, the most
important inspiration for the creation of the Charter and the most
important touchstone for its interpretation are the distinctive features
of the history and ambitions of Canadians.
When I read the Supreme Court's Charter decisions since 1982,
including Justice Wilson's, I am reminded of the words of another
person born in Aberdeen, Scotland and a prime mover behind the
creation of Dalhousie Law School a century ago. Justice Robert
Sedgewick, a respected Halifax lawyer, eventually became Deputy
Minister of Justice for Canada and then a judge on the Supreme Court
of Canada. He served at a time when the Privy Council often reversed
the decisions of the Supreme Court, especially in major constitutional
cases. Most of the decisions of the Privy Council were terse, dry and
legalistic with no grounding in Canadian history or values. In the
hands of the Privy Council the ConstitutionAct, 1867 was just another
municipal by-law to be interpreted by legalistically parsing its words.
Justice Sedgewick finally rebelled and wrote these memorable
words:
Another principle of construction in regard to the B.N.A. Act must be
stated, viz., it being in effect a constitutional agreement or compact, or
treaty, between three independent communities or commonwealths,
each with its own parliamentary institutions and governments, effect
must, as far as possible, be given to the intention of these communities,
when entering into the compact, to the words used as they understood
them, and to the objects they had in view when they asked the Imperial

10. Wilson, "The Scottish Enlightenment: The Third Shumiatcher Lecture in The Law as
Literature" (1987), 51 Sask. LR. 251 at 269.
11. ConstitutionAct, 1867, 30 and 31 Victoria, c.3.
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Parliament to pass the Act. In other words, it must be viewed from a
Canadian standpoint. Although an Imperial Act, to interpret it correctly reference may be had to the phraseology and nomenclature of
pre-Confederation Canadian legislation and jurisprudence, as well as to
the history of the union movement and to the condition, sentiment and
surroundings of the Canadian people at the time. In the B.N.A. Act it
was in a technical sense only that the Imperial Parliament spoke; it was
there that in a real and substantial sense the Canadian people spoke, and
it is to their language, as they understood it, that effect must be given.' 2
I believe that throughout the 1980s the Supreme Court of Canada
conceived of and interpreted the Charter in much the same way as
Justice Sedgewick articulated his vision of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.
For me, a striking illustration of this was the oral argument in an early
Charter case, Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act.13
The issue in that case was whether section 7 of the Charter, and in
particular the phrase 'principles of fundamental justice', created a
procedural right, a substantive right, or both. Counsel for all governments 14 waved the spectre of the economic due process decisions of
the United States Supreme Court early in this century and argued for a
narrow English-style 'natural justice' procedural interpretation of section 7. Counsel for the accused argued, more or less, for simple
adoption of the American substantive/procedural interpretation. The
oral argument had unfolded for only a few minutes when the questions
of Justices Lamer and Wilson made it clear that they were thinking
along a completely different, and quite original, line - namely, a
distinctive Canadian interpretation of the phrase 'principles of fundamental justice', one that would incorporate the British natural justice
procedural stream and then add on some substantive protections in
areas in which the judiciary was particularly well-suited to understand
and articulate those protections (e.g. criminal justice protections but
not economic protections). When the Court handed down its judgment some months later the distinctive Canadian interpretation foreshadowed in Justice Lamer's and Justice Wilson's questions formed
the centrepiece of the judgment. The whole process of argument and
decision in that case served as a perfect illustration of the observation
that Justice Wilson made in a speech in Edinburgh three years later:

12. Re ProhibitoryLiquor Laws (1895), 24 S.C.R. 170 at 231.
13. Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 (S.C.C.).
14. I was counsel for the Attorney General of Saskatchewan in this case.
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While some enlightenment can flow from comparative constitutional
law, care must be taken to avoid a mechanical application of concepts
developed in different cultural and constitutional contexts.' 5
There is, in my view, a second dimension to the patriotism theme
in Justice Wilson's constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Wilson believed that the Charter was intended to be, and deserved to be, a strong
thread binding Canadians together. In other words, one of the substantive components of Justice Wilson's patriotism was passionate
attachment to the values enshrined in the Charter coupled with a belief
that her passionate attachment was shared by most other Canadians.
She referred to the adoption of the Charter as "a national political
16
choice by Canadians".
This view of the place of the Charter in Canadian life and affairs
had important implications for Justice Wilson's interpretation of the
Charter. It made her, I believe, bolder in her approach to the Charter
and inclined to be very broad in her interpretation of the coverage of
the Charter. A few examples will illustrate these observations.
First, it is a hoary proposition of the common law that judges
should decide cases on the narrowest possible basis; they should go no
farther, in terms of the enunciation of legal principles, than is necessary to decide the individual case before them. A sub-set of this
general proposition is that cases raising constitutional issues should be
decided, if possible, on non-constitutional grounds. Justice Wilson
simply does not believe that this proposition should be followed in
Charter cases; on the contrary, because she believes so strongly in the
values of the Charter she never hesitates to use it as the basis for a
decision if that is possible. The best example is Singh where the
question was the validity of the statutory regime for refugee determination contained in the ImmigrationAct. The Court unanimously held
that the regime was invalid. The six judges split evenly, however, on
the basis for the decision. Three grounded their decision in the
CanadianBill of Rights; Justice Beetz said:
Like my colleague, Madame Justice Wilson... I conclude that these
appeals ought to be allowed. But I do so on the basis of the Canadian
Bill of Rights. I refrain from expressing my views on the question
whether the CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms is applicable at
all to the circumstances of these cases and more particularly, on the

15. Wilson, "The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial Interpretation" (Edinburgh,
1988), at p.6.
16. Ibid., p.1.
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important question whether the Charter affords any protection against a
deprivation or the threat of a deprivation of the right to life, liberty or
security of the person by foreign governments. 7
In contrast, Justice Wilson (speaking also for Chief Justice Dickson
and Justice Lamer) said:
In the written submissions presented in December, 1984, counsel considered whether the procedures for the adjudication of refugee status
claims violated the CanadianBill of Rights, in particular s.2(e). There
can be no doubt that this statute continues in full force and effect and
that the rights conferred in it are expressly preserved by s.26 of the
Charter. However, since I believe that the present situation falls within
the constitutional protection afforded by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, I prefer to base my decision upon the Charter."
A second illustration of Justice Wilson's desire to use the Charter
to enunciate important and shared national values is her position on
what I would call Charter 'coverage' issues. In virtually every case, if
the question was 'Is this activity government conduct under section 32
of the Charter?' Justice Wilson's answer was 'Yes'. Thus, in Operation Dismantle 9 she held that all Cabinet decisions were subject, in
appropriate cases, to Charter review. She tersely concluded:
Since there is no reason in principle to distinguish between Cabinet
decisions made pursuant to statutory authority and those made in the
exercise of the royal prerogative, and since the former clearly fall
within the ambit of the Charter, I conclude that the latter do so also."
And, in the mandatory retirement quartet, Justice Wilson's position was that universities (McKinney2' and Harrison,22 dissent), hospitals (Stoffman,23 dissent) and community colleges (DouglasCollege 4 )
were all 'government' under section 32 of the Charter. She reached
these conclusions because she has a broad conception of the role of
government in Canadian society. As she expressed it in McKinney:

17. Supra, note 6, pp.429-430.
18. [bid., p.443.
19. OperationDismantle Inc. v. The Queen et al. (1985), 18 D.LR. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.).
20. Ibid., p.498.
21. McKinney v. Board of Governors of the University of Guelph (1990), 76 D.LR. (4th) 55
(s.C.C.).
22. University ofBritish Columbia v. Harrisonand Connell (1990), 77 D.L.R. (4th) 55 (S.C.C.).
23. Vancouver GeneralHospitalet al.v. Stoffinan et al. (1990), 76 D.LR. (4th) 700 (S.C.C.).
24. Douglas College v. DouglaslKwantlen Faculty Association (1990), 77 D.L.R. (4th) 94
(s.C.C.).
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I believe that this historical review demonstrates that Canadians have a
somewhat different attitude towards government and its role from our
U.S. neighbours. Canadians recognize that government has traditionally had and continues to have an important role to play in the creation
and preservation of a just Canadian society. The state has been looked
to and has responded to demands that Canadians be guaranteed adequate health care, access to education and a minimum level of fimancial security to name but a few examples. It is, in my view, untenable to
suggest that freedom is co-extensive with the absence of government.
Experience shows the contrary, that freedom has often required the
intervention and protection of government against private action....
All of these observations lead, in my opinion, to the conclusion that
a concept of minimal state intervention should not be relied on to
justify a restrictive interpretation of "government" or "government
action". Governments act today through many different instrumentalities
depending upon their suitability for attaining the objectives governments seek to attain. The realities of the modern state place government in many different roles vis-A-vis its citizens, some of which
cannot be effected, or cannot be best and most efficiently effected,
directly by the apparatus of government itself. We should not place
form ahead of substance and permit the provisions of the Charter to be
circumvented by the simple expedient of creating a separate entity and
having it perform the role. We must, in my opinion, examine the nature
of the relationship between that entity and government in order to5
decide whether when it acts it truly is "government" which is acting2
A third illustration of Justice Wilson's belief that the Charter is
central to discourse and progress on major public issues is her rejection of judicially constructed doctrines that would remove certain
subjects from the judicial arena. The best example of this is, of
course, her explicit rejection of the American 'political questions'
doctrine in OperationDismantle.
I turn finally, and briefly, to a third dimension of the patriotism
theme in Justice Wilson's jurisprudence. In my view, Justice Wilson's
patriotism is directed to Canada at a national rather than a regional or
provincial level. In her eyes, the Charter articulates values that are
shared by all Canadians irrespective of their province of residence or
cultural, linguistic, racial and other factors. The Charter, as mentioned above, represents "a national political choice by Canadians". 5
One sees this focus on the national perspective in Justice Wilson's
decisions in other areas of constitutional or quasi-constitutional law.

25. Supra, note 21, pp.5 8 2 -5 8 3 .
26. Supra, note 16.
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For example, in Towne Cinema27 she wrote that the community standard for obscenity was a national one:
The standard we are concerned with, it seems to me, is the degree of
exploitation of sex which the Canadian community at any given point
of time is prepared to accept in its movies. This is sometimes referred
to as the Canadian standard of tolerance?
And in federalism cases Justice Wilson was probably the judge
most supportive of national jurisdiction during her years on the Court.
On the basis of the record, she does not appear to have been as
interested in federalism issues as in Charter issues. She participated in
52 federalism cases but wrote only 14 judgments (27 per cent as
opposed to her 44 per cent judgment-writing: case participation ratio
in Charter cases). Moreover, many of her federalism judgments were
written in rather minor cases. Finally, unlike some of her colleagues
like Chief Justice Dickson and Justices Beetz and La Forest, and
unlike herself in Charter cases, Justice Wilson did not attempt to
develop and articulate a philosophy in federalism cases. In spite of
these disclaimers and qualifications, the record establishes that in
close cases Justice Wilson tended to side with the national government. For example, in her very first constitutional case on the Court
she alone sided with Ottawa in the GeorgiaStraits29 case. And in her
last federalism case she wrote a lone dissent in favour of Ottawa in
CentralWestern Railway.' It would be wrong, however, to conclude
that Justice Wilson was a powerful and passionate centralist in the Sir
John A. Macdonald/Chief Justice Laskin mold. However, her instincts
were to support laws enacted by both levels of government and to
uphold national laws in close cases. Her notion of the country, as
reflected in her federalism jurisprudence, was one rooted in a strong
central government. This is consistent with her very strongly held
view that the Charter gives voice to shared national values.
H. The Visionary Theme
When I first thought of the word 'visionary' to describe Justice Wilson's
constitutional jurisprudence, my thoughts were all complimentary - I

27. Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. R., (1985), 18 D.LR. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
28. Ibid., p.22.
29. Re Strait of Georgia [19841 1 S.C.R. 388.
30. Central Western Railway Corporationv. United TransportationUnion et al. (1990), 76
D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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was thinking of a person who combines imagination and strength,
foresight and perseverance. Imagine my surprise when I looked in my
dictionary and discovered that the adjective 'visionary' is defined as
"characterized by impractical ideas or schemes ... not real; imaginary
... not capable of being carried out; merely speculative and impractical".3 1 The noun is not any better: "a person who has impractical ideas
or schemes".' Fortunately, I looked up the page at the word 'vision'
and found: "a mental image; especially, an imaginative contemplation
... the ability to perceive something not actually visible, as through
mental acuteness or keen foresight". 3 That is precisely what I had in
mind when I first associated the word 'visionary' with Justice Wilson
namely, a judge who combined, especially in her Charter judgments, contemplation, intellect, imagination and foresight.
The foresight, or concentration on the future, in Justice Wilson's
(and indeed the Court's) Charter jurisprudence is illustrated by her
rejection of the framer's intent approach to interpretation. The most
explicit rejection of this approach is contained in Justice Lamer's
judgment in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act.
Justice Wilson clearly agreed with this rejection. In a thoughtful
speech entitled "The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial
Interpretation" she talked about the limitations of the framer's intent
approach:
One very influential school of American scholars believes that the
Constitution should be interpreted according to the intent of those who
framed it. The framer's intent school holds that, for the constitutional
enterprise to be legitimate, answers to constitutional problems must
come from the text of the Constitution itself. Contemporary societal
values are irrelevant to this enterprise. What is relevant are the values
held by the framers at the time the Constitution was created. What the
Constitution meant to the framers, this school concludes, is what the
Constitution should mean for all time.
This approach presented some serious problems for United States
judges. How were they to know what the framers meant 200 years
ago? Even if they could actually talk to the framers of their constitution, would the framers' intention emerge as uniform and clear? And
what of modem constitutional problems that hinge on issues that didn't
even exist two hundred years ago. How could the framers of the United
States constitution have had an intent relating to desegregation of

31. Webster's New World Dictionary (College Edition, 1968), p. 1 6 3 1 .
32. Loc. cit.
33. Loc. cit.

230 The Dalhousie Law Journal
schools in an era before general public education? How could the
framers, living at the dawn of the industrial revolution, have had any
opinion about the validity of maximum hours of work legislation?
There is, however, an even more fundamental question that the
American judges had to pose to themselves. Why should a group of
men (and I stress men) long since deceased be allowed to constrain the
progressive development of the American constitution? Why should
they put it into an 18th century straightjacket? While we often look to
the distant past with nostalgia and occasionally for inspiration, we
surely cannot avoid the conclusion that we are very fortunate indeed to
be living in an age that is more tolerant, more democratic and more
open than any preceding epoch in our history.
My point here can be underlined by a simple thought experiment.
Let us ask ourselves what the United States framers' intent was on the
issue of the rights of women. We must keep in mind that we are talking
about a period long before women had the right to vote; a period when
married women had no legal existence separate from their husbands; a
period when their entire lives were absorbed in Kirche, Kiche and
Kinder. Surely womens' rights were not high on the agenda of the
framers of the American Constitution....
Well, haven't times changed? Today's approach to women's rights
is informed by an overall societal commitment to sexual equality. And
yet, if we took the framers' intent school seriously, we would be forced
to admit that [today's societal commitment does not reflect] an original
constitutional truth....
Thus, we can see that in certain cases it would be unthinkable to
allow the framers' intent to govern constitutional interpretation.
Turning from approach to substance, in my view Justice Wilson's

most visionary, and ultimately lasting, contribution to Charter jurisprudence was her insistence that the focus of analysis should be on the
effects of laws and government conduct on individuals. For more than
one hundred years in federalism cases there has been a murky debate
about whether the purpose or effects of a law are controlling in
constitutional analysis. The federalism jurisprudence is repleat with
the language of 'aims at' (purpose) and 'merely effects' or 'incidental
effect' (effects). Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada decided
not to pursue this line of analysis. In Big M Drug Mart, 'the Court

said, correctly in my view, that a law would violate the Charter if

34. Supra, note 15, pp.9-12.
35. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985), 18 D.LR. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
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either its purpose or effects were contrary to the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter.
In a separate concurring judgment, Justice Wilson explicitly referred to "the distinction between the analysis demanded by the Charter and the analysis traditionally pursued in resolving division of
powers litigation under ss.91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867".36
That distinction she articulated in these terms:
In my view, the constitutional entrenchment of civil liberties in the
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms necessarily changes the
analytic approach the courts must adopt in such cases ...While it
remains perfectly valid to evaluate the purpose underlying a particular
enactment in order to determine whether the Legislature has acted
within its constitutional authority in division of power terms, the Charter demands an evaluation of the impingement of even intra vires
legislation on the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. It
asks not whether the Legislature has acted for a purpose that is within
the scope of the authority of that tier of government, but rather whether
in so acting it has had the effect of violating an entrenched individual
right. It is, in other words, first and foremost an effects-oriented
documentY
In my view, Justice Wilson's and the Court's treatment of the
Charter in 'an effects-oriented' context in Big M Drug Mart and in
most of the subsequent Charter cases is the single most useful principle identified for Charter interpretation. It properly focuses judicial,
and therefore governmental, attention on the intended beneficiaries of
the Charter - individuals - and it compels them to recognize that
what is central are the consequences of laws and government conduct
to those individuals. The Charter will fulfil its fundamental role in
Canadian society only if it results in actual, real world protection of
individual rights and freedoms from government infringement, irrespective of the motives of governments in trying to abridge them.
A second substantive component of the visionary quality of Justice
Wilson's constitutional jurisprudence was her forceful articulation
that the Charter created a new regime for Canadian governments. The
relevant questions in Canadian constitutional law were no longer just
what has the majority done (the question flowing from Canadian
democratic and parliamentary supremacy principles) and which level
of government can do a certain thing (the question flowing from
Canadian federalism). The Charter posed a whole new and different

36. Ibid., p.369.
37. Ibid., pp.371-372.
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question, namely whether the majority in either level of Canadian
government could enact a particular law or engage in a particular
course of conduct. Justice Wilson firmly grasped the new umbrella
question posed by the Charter and recognized that it transformed both
the realm of discourse in Canadian constitutional law and the role of
the courts, especially the Supreme Court of Canada, in the constitutional process. As Justice Wilson herself expressed it:
[T]he CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedomsrepresents a national
political choice. Certain fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed to the citizens and the courts have been given the task of ensuring
that governments respect them. This role is, of necessity, an antimajoritarian one. The legislature is elected by popular vote and is
accountable to the electorate. In general, it will pass legislation that it
feels will be to the greater advantage of the nation as a whole. The
courts must carefully scrutinize this legislation to ensure that it does not
sacrifice the rights of the few simply to enhance the welfare of the
many. For if the courts allowed rights to be overridden for merely
utilitarian reasons the protection afforded to the individual would be
illusory indeed. It is precisely when the majority have something to
gain from violating our rights that our rights are most in jeopardy.38
A good illustration of this conception of the Charter in operation is
Justice Wilson's interpretation of section 1 of the Charter. After some
initial caution, in Regina v. Oakes39 a unanimous Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Dickson, boldly articulated a very demanding
standard of justification for governments trying to rely on section 1.
In later cases some of the judges appeared to move away from a
uniformly rigorous application of Oakes. Justice Wilson, however,
consistently held to Oakes because in her eyes any violation of a
Charter right was so serious that it could be accepted by the courts
only if the government's justification was overwhelming.
Moreover, Justice Wilson, perhaps more than any other judge on
the Court, insisted that there be a strong evidentiary basis for assertions by governments that their limitations on the rights and freedoms
protected by the Charter were reasonable and therefore justified under
section 1. of the Charter. Thus, for example, in Singh she was not
prepared to accept a government argument of administrative convenience: "I have considerable doubt that the type of utilitarian considera-

38. Supra, note 15, pp. 1 6 - 17 .
39. R. v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.LR. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.).
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tion brought forward by Mr. Bowie can constitute a justification for a
limitation on the rights set out in the Charter". 40
Justice Wilson's insistence in Charter cases that governments openly
justify their laws and conduct if these potentially violated the Charter
was parallelled in consistent fashion in other areas of constitutional
law. She attaches great importance to the values of openness and
equality and believes that governments must respect and indeed exemplify these values. One sees this in a case like Smallwood v. Sparling41
where the Supreme Court held that a former Premier had to appear
before a federal inquiry and testify about various government matters.
Justice Wilson said:
Mr. Smallwood has no exemption from the universal testimonial duty
to give evidence simply by virtue of his status as former Premier and
Minister of the Province of Newfoundland. Nor does he enjoy either
by statute or at common law any blanket immunity to give oral testimony or produce documents. His immunity in that regard is relative
only and must wait upon the content of the proposed examination. Mr.
Smallwood cannot be the arbiter of his own immunity.42
Justice Wilson was also prepared to restrict, albeit in only a limited
way, the notion of judicial immunity. In MacKeigan v. Hickman4 3 a
provincial Royal Commission was established to inquire into all aspects of the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall for murder. At
one point in the long Marshall saga the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
rendered a reference judgment holding that Marshall's conviction was
wrong but that any miscarriage ofjustice was more apparent than real.
In the course of its hearings the Commission sought to compel the five
members of the Court of Appeal who had sat on the reference to attend
and testify concerning certain aspects of the reference. The three
matters on which it sought to compel testimony were the inclusion of
the former Attorney General on the panel hearing the reference (there
was some evidence before the Commission that he had been involved
as Attorney General in the original Marshall case), the contents of the
record that was in fact before the Court of Appeal (the Court's judgment appeared to rely on affidavits that may not have been entered at
the Reference hearing) and what factors in the opinion of the Court of
40. Supra, note 6, p.46 9.
41. Smallwood v. Sparling etal (1982), 141 D.L.R. (3rd) 395 (S.C.C.).
42. Ibid., p.411.
43. MacKeigan v. Hickman (1989). 61 D.LR. (4th) 688 (S.C.C.). I was counsel to the
respondents, the Commissioners of the Royal Commission into the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution
in this case.
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Appeal constituted a miscarriage ofjustice. The judges of the Court of
Appeal refused to attend, citing the principle of judicial immunity. A
majority of the Supreme Court agreed with their position. Justice
Wilson dissented in part, however, and would have permitted the
Commission to compel testimony from the judges about the composition of the panel and the contents of the record before the Court.
Justice Wilson drew a sharp line between adjudicative and administrative matters and would apply an absolute immunity to only the former.
She wrote:
I write in support of the judgment of my colleague, Justice Cory, on
this appeal. I agree with him and with my other colleagues, that the
judiciary enjoys an absolute immunity with respect to its adjudicative
function. I also agree with him that the judiciary's immunity with
respect to its administrative function is not absolute and that it must
give way in circumstances where the administration of justice is itself
under review by a body with the constitutional authority to undertake
such a review. It would be anomalous indeed if in a case such as the
present all aspects of the justice system leading up to the wrongful
conviction of Mr. Marshall, his subsequent release and his receipt of
compensation should be inquired into by the commission except the
administrative decisions made by the judiciary."
A third substantive component of the visionary aspect of Justice
Wilson's constitutional jurisprudence was her deep commitment to
the view that the Charter was intended to protect those members of
Canadian society who are in special need of protection. All of the
rights and freedoms in the Charter are worded in a neutral fashion, i.e.
they are usually stated as being applicable to everyone. However,
Justice Wilson clearly felt that the underlying purpose of the Charter
was to provide special protection for disadvantaged persons or groups.
As she expressed it in her Edinburgh lecture:
The anti-majoritarian nature of rights provides valuable guidance to the
courts in interpreting the Constitution. As judges we should ask ourselves which groups are most likely to be ignored in the making of
legislation. The poor, the oppressed, the powerless, racial minorities,
accused criminals - even in the healthiest of democracies these groups
are typically shut out of the political process. When assessing the
rights of individuals from these groups we must be particularly vigilant. I believe that the true test of rights is how well they serve the less
privileged and least popular segments of the society."
44. Ibid., p.6 95 .
7
45. Supra, note 15, p.1 .
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Justice Wilson consistently held to this conception of the Charter
in her judgments. Although she clearly believed that the rights and
freedoms in the Charter should be available to everyone, anyone
reading her judgments would have to conclude that those judgments
were very influenced (and openly so) by the position of the litigants in
the cases. Refugees (Singh), women (Morgentaler), children (Irwin
Toy'), workers (the labour trilogy47) - in Justice Wilson's judgments
there is a palpable sympathy for these groups and a genuine desire to
interpret the Charter to provide them with greater protection. In the
equality cases she explicitly enunciated "sterotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice" as touchstones for the interpretation of section 15 of the Charter.' And in
Irwin Toy Justice Wilson (in a judgment co-authored with Chief
Justice Dickson and Justice Lamer) rejected the argument that section
7 of the Charter protected the economic rights of corporations. At the
same time, the three justices expressly left open the possibility that
section 7 does protect some economic rights that would be particularly
crucial to disadvantaged members of society. In a passage that for me
represents the underlying philosophy of the Charter adhered to by
these three justices they wrote:
The only remaining argument is that corporations are protected against
deprivations of some sort of "economic liberty".
There are several reasons why we are of the view that this argument
can not succeed ...
what is immediately striking about [section 7] is the
inclusion of "security of the person" as opposed to "property". This
stands in contrast to the classic liberal formulation, adopted, for example, in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the American Bill of
Rights, which provides that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law". The intentional exclusion of
property from s.7, and the substitution therefor of "security of the
person" has, in our estimation, a dual effect, First, it leads to a general
inference that economic rights as generally encompassed by the
term"property" are not within the perimeters of the s.7 guarantee. This
is not to declare, however, that no right with an economic component
can fall within "security of the person". Lower courts have found that

46. A.G. Que. v. Irwin Toy Ltd. (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
47. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, Labour Relations Act and Police
Officers Collective BargainingAct (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.); PublicService Alliance
of Canada et al. v. The Queen in Right of Canada (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 249 (S.C.C.);
Governmment of Saskatchewan et al.v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Locals
544, 496, 635 and 955 et al. (1987), 38 D.LR. (4th) 277 (S.C.C.).
48. R. v. Turpin (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 8 (S.C.C.), at p.35 .
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the rubric of "economic rights" embraces a broad spectrum of interests,
ranging from such rights, included in various international covenants,
as rights to social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food,
clothing and shelter, to traditional property-contract rights. To exclude
all of these at this early moment in the history of Charter interpretation
seems to us to be precipitous. We do not, at this moment choose to
pronounce upon whether these economic rights fundamental to human
life or survival are to be treated as though they are of the same ilk as
corporate-commercial economic rights. In so stating, we find the
second effect of the inclusion of "security of the person" to be that a
corporation'seconomic rights find no constitutional protection in that
section.49
(emphasis in original)
III. The Heretic Theme
In American constitutional law Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was
sometimes called 'the great dissenter'. This was a misleading sobriquet because in fact Justice Holmes did not dissent in an especially
high number of cases. However, the high profile of some of the cases,
the pithy and passionate eloquence of his dissents and, importantly,
the acceptance by later courts of many of his dissenting positions all
combined to create a memory of Holmes, nearly a century later, as
'the great dissenter'.
Justice Wilson leaves the Court with a bit of a reputation, at least in
the legal community, as another great dissenter. The perception
would be that although she joined the majority, and indeed wrote for
it, in many major Charter cases she also disagreed with the majority in
many other Charter cases. As with Holmes, however, the perception
is misleading. Justice Wilson participated in 149 Charter cases. She
wrote a dissent in only 23, or 14.5 per cent, of these cases.
I suspect that some of Justice Wilson's reputation as a dissenter or
heretic is based on a couple of other factors. One is that, like Holmes,
Justice Wilson wrote some of her dissents in a particularly forceful
and eloquent way in highly visible cases (e.g. Edward Books Sunday closing). The other reason is that Justice Wilson also wrote 26
concurring opinions in Charter cases. Many of these opinions are
based on quite different philosophical bases and legal principles from
those enunciated by her colleagues (e.g. Morgentaler,OperationDismantle, Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act). Taken
together, the dissenting and concurring judgments lend support to the
49. Supra, note 46, pp.6 3 2 -6 3 3 .
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perception that, even on a Court where at least several of the justices
shared her basic views about how the Charter should be interpreted
and the role of the Court in the interpretation process, Justice Wilson
was nevertheless somewhat of a heretic - a judge who expressed
opinions "opposed to official or established views or doctrines"'.
Let me give just two examples of areas in which Justice Wilson
swam outside the mainstream, through either or both her dissenting
and concurring opinions. The first is Justice Wilson's consistent and
always bold attempts to pour substantive content into the notion of
'liberty' in section 7 of the Charter. Whereas many of the judges on
the Court would often try to decide cases under other sections of the
Charter or even under other components of section 7 itself (perhaps
out of a fear that they might open the Pandora's box of the economic
liberty decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the turn of the
century or perhaps because of a reluctance to loosen the word 'liberty'
in section 7 from its Legal Rights anchor), Justice Wilson seemed
actually to prefer thinking in terms of, and grounding her decisions in,
the notion of liberty. Thus in Jones," Justice Wilson alone talked
about whether liberty included a parental right to educate a child in
accordance with his or her conscientious beliefs while the rest of the
Court preferred to resolve the cases by interpreting the phrase 'principles of fundamental justice' in section 7. And inMorgentaler,Justice
Wilson alone spoke at length about the connection between the notion
of liberty and a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy whereas the other judges rested their decisions on an interpretation of phrases 'security of the person' and 'principles of fundamental justice'.
It is clear from the cases that Justice Wilson regards liberty as one
of the most important values in a democratic society. Her reasons for
this view are perhaps best and most eloquently stated in Morgentaler
where she had the opportunity to expand on her earlier discussions of
the meaning of liberty in Singh and Jones:
The Charter and the right to individual liberty guaranteed under it are
inextricably tied to the concept of human dignity....
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and
freedom guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to
choose their own religion and their own philosophy of life, the right to
choose with whom they will associate and how they will express
50. Supra, note 31, p.6 7 9 - definition of 'heresy'.
51. Jones v. R. (1986), 31 D.L.R. 94th) 569 (S.C.C.).
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themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue. These are all examples of the basic theory
underlying the Charter, namely, that the state will respect choices made
by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.
Thus an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter
is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the
right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a
broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed,
grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of
fundamental personal importance.
This view is consistent with the position I took in ... Jones ... One
issue raised in that case was whether the right to liberty in s.7 of the
Charter included a parent's right to bring up his children in accordance
with his conscientious beliefs. In concluding that it did I stated ...:
"I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing
'liberty' as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society
had in mind the freedom of the individual to develop and realize
his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit his own
character, to make his own choices for good or ill, to be nonconformist, idiosyncratic and even eccentric - to be, in today's
parlance 'his own person' and accountable as such. John Stuart
Mill described it as 'pursuing our own good in our own way'...."
Liberty in a free and democratic society does not require the state to
approve the personal decisions made by its citizens; it does, however,
require the state to respect them.52
My second example of Justice Wilson's heresy is her position on
section 1 of the Charter. Although the Court was unanimous when it
enunciated its section 1 test in Oakes there can be no doubt that in
some recent cases the majority of the Court has abandoned the rigors
of Oakes in favour of a more deferential, balancing test. This is

particularly true for those judges who believe that the Oakes test may
be fine in a criminal justice context but is simply too hard a test to
impose on governments in the context of social and economic legislation. Justice Wilson, however, has not moved. She consistently
applies Oakes, without qualification or dilution and in all categories of
53
cases.

52. Supra, note 8, pp.485-48 7 .
53. See, for example, her judgment in McKinney, supra, note 21.
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I believe that Justice Wilson's distinctive or heretical positions can
be explained by her belief, shared with several of her colleagues but
held by her in a more absolute fashion, that the Charter really was
intended to impose new and important constraints on governments.
She firmly believes that Canada is no longer just a democratic federation where all the constitutional issues are resolved on the basis of
such principles as parliamentary supremacy and distribution of powers. Although these remain and continue to be important in the
Canadian Constitution, they have now been joined by entrenched
constitutional rights and freedoms which, Justice Wilson believes,
must be protected in a particularly vigilant way by the courts.
Conclusion
Justice Bertha Wilson left large footprints in the sands of Canadian
constitutional law, especially the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. She was a patriot - a judge who strove to identify and
articulate a distinctive Canadian jurisprudence to reflect a very distinctive country. She was a visionary - a judge who understood the
values emanating from the Charter and a judge who had the good
fortune through position, skill and dedication to make those values
come alive through her judgments. She was a heretic - a judge who
went farther than her colleagues in using the Charter to change the
way in which governments operate and to raise the expectations of
many Canadians, especially disadvantaged Canadians.
Justice Wilson was, it is clear, a perfect judge for her time. Her
career, especially as a judge, was wonderfully successful. And her
legacy is substantial. I believe that she possessed many personal and
professional characteristics which combined to make her so successful. I would highlight three of them. First, Justice Wilson has a
formidable intellect. She is a scholarly woman with an active and
inquiring mind who loves research and writing. She is exceptionally
well-read and exhibits a great breadth of intellectual interests. Secondly, Justice Wilson is a woman and judge of great compassion whether as a parson's wife in rural Scotland or a justice of the highest
court in Canada (the bookends of her career) she strove mightily to
make the lives of individual people, especially disadvantaged people,
better. Thirdly, Justice Wilson possesses a passion and boldness which
enabled her to think creatively, write powerfully and, through these,
challenge governments and conventional wisdom. When I was working this summer on this paper my recreational reading for a few
evenings was a book entitled From Beirut to Jerusalem written by
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Thomas Friedman, the correspondent for the New York Times in first
Beirut and then Jerusalem throughout the 1980s. Friedman tells of an
interview he had with Prime Minister Shamir:
Shortly after Yitzhak Shamir became Prime Minister in October 1996,
I went to see him with A.M. Rosenthal, then the executive editor of the
New York Times...

As the interview drew to a close in the Prime Minister's office, Abe
asked Shamir one of those cosmic questions reporters always ask heads
of state. "Mr. Shamir ... when your term of office is up, what would

you like people to say about you?"
Shamir leaned forward, clasped his hands together, looked Abe in
the eye, and said, "I want them to say that I kept things quiet".
When I read that my mind leaped back to my Wilson paper. I
thought to myself: of all the judges who have served on the Supreme
Court of Canada Justice Wilson would be the least likely to think or
say that. Constitutional law for her was not about keeping things
quiet. She lived faithfully Dalhousie's Weldon Tradition of public
service through her judgments, her lectures and her inspiration to the
next generation. The tides of time will wash against her immense
constitutional footprints. Like all footprints in the sand, some of hers
will disappear, others will diminish. But many of her footprints will
endure forever. And, perhaps of equal importance, she will have
pointed the way forward so that succeeding generations of Canadians
can make their constitutional footprints good, fair and just ones.

54. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1989). at p.283.

